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Mill’s Proof of the Principle of Utility*
In a famous, or infamous, paragraph or so early on in chaptcr 4 of Utili­
tarianism, Mill provides his argument for die Principle of Utility. I will 
first quote the passage at some length and rehearse two very familiar 
objections to it. Then I will go on to say what I intend to do with the 
material I will have introduced.
The utilitarian doctrine is, that happiness is desirable, and the 
only thing desirable, as an end; all other things being only desirable 
as means to that end. What ought to be required of this doctrine—  
what conditions is it requisite that the doctrine should fulfil— to 
make good its claim to be believed?
The only proof capable o f being given that an object is visible, 
is that people actually see it. The only proof that a sound is audible, 
is that people hear it: and so of the other sources of our experience. 
In like manner, I apprehend, the sole evidence it is possible to pro­
duce that anything is desirable, is that people do actually desire it. 
If the end which the utilitarian doctrine proposes to itself were not, 
in theory and in practice, acknowledged to be an end, nothing 
could ever convince any person that it was so. No reason can be 
given why the general happiness is desirable, except that each per­
son, so far as lie believes it to be attainable, desires his own happi­
ness. This, however, being a fact, wc have not only all the proof 
which the case admits of, but all which it is possible to require, that 
happiness is a good: that each person’s happiness is a good to that
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person, and the general happiness, therefore, a good to the aggre­
gate of all persons. (234/4:2-3)'
Almost from the moment it went into print, the passage that I have 
just reproduced was notorious for tlie two fallacies it was alleged to con­
tain, one for cach of the two stretches of argument that make it up.2 The 
first stretch of argument (which is what I will call it from here on in) 
moves from the premise that each person desires his oim happiness to 
the conclusion that each person’s happiness is desirable for him. The 
second stretch of argument moves from the conclusion of the previous 
stretch, that each person’s happiness is desirable for him, to the further 
conclusion, that “the general happiness. . .  [is] a good to die aggregate 
of all persons.”
iHie first stretch o f argument consists, more or less, o f an explana­
tion o f the legitimacy of the transition from its premise to its conclusion; 
the explanation adduces analogous arguments that arc clearly in order. 
You show that something is visible by showing that it is seen; you show 
that something is audible by showing that it is heard. Similarly, you show 
that something is desirable by showing that it is desired. It is standardly 
pointed out, however, that Mill’s use of his model arguments seems to 
turn on an equivocation. ‘Audible’ means “can be heard," and ‘visible’ 
means “can be seen.” But ‘desirable’, in the sense required by the argu­
ment’s conclusion, does not mean “can be desired,” but something 
along the lines o f “should be desired” or “worth desiring.” The first 
stretch o f argument is apparently supported by no more than a bad pun.
The second stretch of argument looks just as bad, on a par with tak­
ing what is good for each of Boeing’s workers— say, a pay hike— to be 
good for Boeing, only with the added obstacle that "the aggregate o f all 
persons" is not a corporate person in the way that Boeing is, and so there 
is no clear sense in which something can be good for it.
I am going to demonstrate that cach stretch o f argument is, not fal­
lacious, but deductively valid. I will show that the conclusion of Mill’s
1. References to Utilitarianism are by page number in the standard edition of John 
Stuart Mill’s Collected Htwto (Toronto and London: University of Toronto Press, Routledge 
fe Kegan Paul, 1967-89), vol. X. followed by chapter and paragraph for the convenience of 
readers to whom the standard edition is not easily accessible; so the reference above is to 
p. 23-1, chap. 4, pars. 2 and 3. Other references in the text will be to the standard edition by 
volume and page number alone; vols. VII and Vlll, which I will refer to frequently, are Mills 
System of Logic.
The quoted passage is presented as only half of the argument: it is supposed to show 
that happiness is desirable, but not yet that happiness is the only thing desirable. It will tum 
out, however, that the apparent division of labor between the two halves of the argument is 
at least misleading.
2. For a discussion of the early history of such criticism, see Steve Gerard, “Desire 
and Desirability: Bradley, Russell and Moore versus Mill.*' in Early AnalyticPldlosojihy:Pr'gf, 
Russell, Wittgenstein, ed. W. W. Tait (Chicago: Open Court Press, 1997), pp. 37-74.
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argument has been badly misunderstood. And, in the course o f so doing, 
I will show that Utilitarianism is a much more tightly constructed text 
than it is generally taken for.
The exercise is intended to be not merely o f textual or historical 
interest. I mean, first, to use the passage to investigate the relations be­
tween theories o f practical reasoning and moral or ethical theories. Prac­
tical reasoning is reasoning aimed at figuring out what to do; a theory of 
practical reasoning is accordingly a theory of how one should go about 
figuring out what to do. A moral or ethical theory (I will use these terms 
interchangeably here) is, on one fairly standard construction o f the no­
tion, a general and systematic theory o f what one should do; that is, it can 
be thought of as a compendium or summary of the results o f practical 
reasoning. If that is right, we might expect a philosopher’s theory of prac­
tical reasoning to determine the architecture o f his moral theory. In the 
course of reconstructing Mill’s arguments, we will see that he does not 
disappoint us on this score: Mill’s utilitarianism drops directly out o f his 
instrumentalist theory of practical reasoning. To be sure, Mill’s is only a 
single case. But making out the claim regarding Mill will lend plausibil­
ity and substance to the more general suggestion regarding the depen­
dence of substantive moral theory on the theory o f practical reasoning. 
If taken up, this suggestion would motivate a shift in focus in ethics, away 
from the moral intuitions which are today routinely treated as the touch­
stone o f moral theorizing, and toward the views of practical reasoning 
that underwrite particular substantive moral or ethical theories.
Second, while I have said that I will show each stretch of argument 
to be deductively valid, I do not think that they are unproblematic when 
put side by side. They do not in fact sit at all well together, and responsi­
bility for the incoherence of the argument that they jointly constitute 
rests, I will argue, with an incoherence in the underlying theory o f prac­
tical reasoning. Now the instrumentalist account o f practical reasoning 
that I will attribute to Mill is a very close relative o f views still ividely ac­
cepted today. So the incoherence that our discussion of Mill will expose 
in the instrumentalist theory is of current philosophical interest. More­
over, if Mill’s reasons are still among the best reasons we have for accept­
ing utilitarianism, and if they turn out to invoke an incoherent account 
of practical reasoning, we will have a reason for balking at utilitarianism. 
To the extent that utilitarianism is still a live moral theory, Uiis result is 
also o f current philosophical interest.
Finally, I will consider how Mill found himself saddled with the in­
strumentalist theory' that was the source of the difficulty I will identify in 
his argument. The explanation I will offer, a failure of nerve in Mill’s 
attempt at a thoroughgoing empiricism, can serve as an object lesson for 
contemporary philosophy of an empiricist bent.
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If, as I have suggested, philosophers have misread Mill's arguments for 
over a century, there are reasons. One is Mill’s practice, necessary in an 
age when philosophy was much less professionalized than it now is, of 
writing prose that could be read and at least partially appreciated by an 
intelligent lay audience (and in particular by authors o f public policy 
whom Mill hoped to influence).5 The elegance of Mill’s writing has ob­
scured the way in which he deploys a technical philosophical vocabulary.4
By way of example, consider the glosses Mill provides for the words 
attached to the utilitarian conception o f the good. In the course o f ex­
plaining what the Principle o f Utility is supposed to amount to, Mill tells 
us that "by happiness is intended pleasure” (210/2:2).5 Shortly before, he 
has stated that "every writer . . . who maintained the theory’ o f utility, 
meant by i t . . .  pleasure . . { 2 0 9 / 2 :  l ) .6 And elsewhere, as one might by­
now expect, he uses ‘utility’ as a synonym for ‘happiness1, as in, “a per­
fectly just conception of Utility or Happiness” (213/2:9). Mill overtly 
introduces ‘utility’, ‘happiness’, and ‘pleasure’ as synonymous terms.
He is equally explicit in connecting these terms, almost as closely, to 
the notion o f desiring. "Desiring a thing and finding it pleasant . . . 
are . . .  in strictness of language, two different modes of naming the same 
psychological fact” (237/4:10, my emphasis). “Almost as closely," be­
cause there is an important distinction to be made between items desired 
only as means to satisfying further desires and items desired on their oivn 
account: the terminological identity is meant to apply only to the latter. 
The restriction o f the scope o f the identification to things desired on
3. I'm grateful to John Rawls for emphasizing to me Mill’s interest in reaching the 
politicians.
4. Compare Skorupski s recent description of Utilitarianism: “It is written for the g:n- 
eral reader. It is not a technical treatise of philosophy, like the of Logic; neither is it a 
carefully polished piece of political argument, as On Liberty is" (John Skorupski John SU-art 
MiU [New York: Routledge, 1989), p. 283). Skorupski takes the second sentence to follow 
from, or at any rate to be of a piece with, the first, This, I will show, is a mistake. Utilitarianism 
is written for the general reader, and it is a "technical treatise of philosophy."
This attempt to write for both audiences at the same time is not unique. The pref.tce 
to Mill’s Principlei of Political Economy concludes with the following announcement: ‘‘Al­
though Ithe writer’s] object is practical, and, as far as the nature of the subject admits, 
popular, he has not attempted to purcliase either of those advantages by the sacrifice of 
strict scientific reasoning. Though he desires that his treatise should be more than a m ;re 
exposition of the abstract doctrines of Political Economy, he is also desirous that such an 
exposition should be found In it” (Ifcxcii).
5. My emphasis. As per usual, Mill adds a clause about the absence of pain; to keep 
the writing manageable, I’m going to suppress this rider from here on in.
6. Again, my emphasis. Mill is being disingenuous here: as he well knew, in the writ­
ing of earlier British moral philosophers, such as David Hume and Adam Smith, 'utility’ 
had meant something very different, and the misunderstanding Mill Is trying to correct was 
in fact quite natural. See Geoff Sayre-McCord, "Hume and the Bauhaus Theory of Ethics," 
Midwest Studies in Philosophy 20 (1996): 280-98.
II
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their own account is important, and I will return to it shortly. With this 
restriction in place, ‘desired’ and ‘found pleasant’ are also synonymous 
terms, and consequently, “to desire anything, except in proportion as 
the idea o f  it is pleasant, is a physical and metaphysical impossibility” 
{238/4:10, my emphasis).
If the object o f desire is, as a matter o f mere nomenclature, plea­
sure, and if ‘pleasure’ is just a synonym for ‘happiness’, then happiness 
should be, again as a matter o f  mere nomenclature, the object, and the 
sole object, o f desire.7 And so it is: Mill follows the argument we are trying 
to unravel with a further argument, purporting to show that people de­
sire only happiness. The argument proceeds by insisting that ‘‘whatever 
is desired otherwise than as a means to some end beyond itself. . .  is 
desired as itself a part of happiness” (237/4:8); inspecting the argument 
shows die point to be that, if something is desired (again, with the scope 
of the claim restricted to desires whose objects are not merely desired as 
means to further ends), it thereby counts as part o f happiness.
With this, we have arrived at a view as to the status of the premise of 
the first stretch of Mill’s argument, that each person desires his own hap­
piness. The premise is analytic, true by virtue of the meanings o f the 
words. (As is the furdier claim, that people desire only happiness nonin- 
strumentally.) It means no more and no less than: people desire what they 
desire. This should be puzzling; it is hard to see how any substantive con­
clusion that Mill wishes to draw could be derived from an empty tautology, 
and it might also seem that this reading o f the premise does not match the 
advertising. Mill, after all, describes the claim that people desire only hap­
piness as "a question of fact and experience, dependent, like all similar 
questions, upon evidence" (237/4:10). I will return to the puzzles later 
on; for the present, I want to let this reading of the premise stand, and note 
only that it allows us to shelve, at any rate temporarily, doubts we may have 
had about the premise’s truth. With those doubts out o f the way, we can go 
on to consider the validity o f the first stretch o f Mill’s "proof."
Ill
Mill introduces his argument by stating “that questions o f ultimate ends 
do not admit o f proof, in the ordinary acceptation of the term” (234/ 
4:1). This passage is commonly used as an excuse for holding Mill to 
lower standards o f argumentation dian usual; if an interpretation of the 
argument makes it come out loose, or shoddy, or invalid, or simply less 
than an argument, the interpretation can be defended by poindng out 
that it was not meant to be a real argument, anyway.8 But another look at 
the passage shows it to be a reminder o f an earlier discussion: “[ijl has
7. I should perhaps note that I am not here taking over Mill's technical sense of 
“nomenclature” (VIII: 704-5).
8. Even as astute a reader of Mill as Skonipski Kills into this trap; see n. 16 below.
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already been remarked, that questions o f ultimate ends do not admit of 
proof, in the ordinary acceptation of the term”; this is in virtue of fea­
tures that they share, as “the first premises. . .  of our conduct," with “the 
first premises of our knowledge” (234/4:1). So before we decide that 
Mill is telling us that we are about to get hand-waving instead of an ar­
gument, we need to look back at this earlier discussion, spell out the 
shared features, and see exactly why it is they preclude “proof.” Now in 
chapter 1, Mill tells us that “such proof as [the Udlitarian or Happiness 
theory] is susceptible o f . . .  cannot be proof in the ordinary and popular 
meaning of the term” (207/1:5). This is evidently the earlier discussion 
to which Mill is referring, and it is here we should look to fill out the 
analogy between the first premises o f knowledge and the first premises 
of conduct on which the inference from desire to desirability is supposed 
to turn.
Description of s o m e th in g  as a “first premise” implies a pattern of 
inference in which it occupics this position. So what we need, first of all, 
from this earlier discussion is the pattern o f inference in which this char­
acterization has its home. Mill obligingly identifies it for us immediately 
after the passage I have just quoted. “Whatever can be proved to be 
good, must be so by being shown to be a means to something admitted 
to be good without proof” (207-8 /1 :5). A contemporary way of putting 
Mill’s view might be to say that all practical reasoning is means-end rea­
soning; or, to use another bit of current vocabulary', that Mill is an instru­
mentalist.®
9. Mill’s instrumentalism seems lo have been inherited; in an editorial footnote, lie 
approvingly quotes his father's "Fragment on Mackintosh”; “All action, as Aristotle says, 
(and all mankind agree with him) is for an end. Actions are essentially means” (JatnesMill, 
Analysis of the Phenomena of the Human Mind [London: Longmans, 18781; “New Ed. with 
Notes Illustrative and Critical by Alexander Bain, Andrew Find later, and George Grcte, 
Edited with Additional Notes by John Stuart Mill"; originally published in 1820; vol, 2, 
p.2C2n.).
Fora display of instrumentalism in the younger Mill’s own writing, see the last chapter 
or the System of Logic, evidently intended by Mill as stage-setting for Utilitarianism (cf. VIII: 
951 n.), where Mill describes the relations between Science and Art. “An” is Mill’s label for 
the domain of practice and action, the area of which “the imperative mood is , . .  charac­
teristic” (VIII :94S). Instrumental reasoning is not only the sole form of practical reasoning 
mentioned in the coursc of Mills discussion; it tsheld entirely responsible for the structure 
of the domain. Art supplies ends, and the role of Science is to determine the means to 
those ends. Not surprisingly, Mill ends up identifying “ the general principles o f . . .  Tele­
ology, or the Doctrine of Ends" with "the principles of Practical Reason" (VIII:949-50).
There is, however, a caveat required here: while Mill's official doctrine remained un­
flinchingly instrumentalist until the day of his death. Vogler has pointed out that in his own 
argumentative practice he helped himself to other and richer forms of practical reasoning. 
What is more, he produced a striking indictment of instrumentalism in his retrospective 
diagnosis of his “mental crisis”: in a strange and touching passage in hh Autobiography, Mill 
argued that if you are an instrumentalist, you ought to find life un livable (1:141—43). For 
discussion, see Candace Vogler, The Deliberative Landscape (New York: Garland Press, in 
press).
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We can now make out the analogy Mill has in mind, between the 
'first premises’ of our knowledge and o f our conduct. On the instrumen­
talist view, a practical justification consists in showing that a proposed 
end is a means to a further end. (More Millian terminology; '‘Questions 
about ends are, in other words, questions what tilings arc desirable” [234/ 
4:2, my emphasis].) That further end may be justified in turn, that is, 
shown to be desirable, by showing it to be a means to a still further end. 
Iterating justifications in this way induces larger patterns of justification 
that can fall into three general types: chains o f justification can continue 
backward forever; they can contain cycles; or they can terminate in ends 
that are not themselves further justified.
The choice between these patterns should sound familiar; it was cer­
tainly familiar to Mill. Beliefs can be justified by further beliefs, and when 
they are, it is usually thought, the same choices arise: betwreen an infinite 
regress, circularity (so-called if you don’t like it) or cohcrence (so-called 
if you do), and foundational beliefs, that is, beliefs that terminate chains 
of justification and are not themselves further justified. In a survey of 
fallacies in A System of Logic, Mill rejects the first two options, for reasons 
that are general enough to apply to practical justifications as well: on the 
one hand, “there cannot be an infinite series o f proof, a chain sus­
pended from nothing" (VIII: 746); on the other, “Reasoning in a Circle” 
is in Mill’s vicwf simply a “more complex and not uncommon variety o f” 
“Petitio Principii, or begging the question” (VIII:820). Mill opts for 
foundationalism, the view that there are “propositions which may rea­
sonably be received without proof” (VIII: 746).
I have so far identified the class o f foundational beliefs, and the class 
of foundational ends, simply in terms of structural features o f the pat­
terns of justifications in which they appear: foundational beliefs are 
those beliefs which are not further justified; foundational ends are those 
ends that are not merely means to further ends. But it is typical o f phi­
losophizing in epistemology and ethics to look for a further and inde­
pendentway of identifying these classes, for example, by taking them to 
be, or to be associated with, an especially immediate feeling. Not surpris­
ingly, given the tradition of British Empiricism in which Mill stood, he 
took the foundational beliefs to correspond to “sensations.” ,(> Mill simi­
larly takes the foundational ends to be objects of especially immediate 
feeling, and it is this presumption that we may suppose licenses Mill’s 
introduction of vocabulary' that, we saw, identifies the objects of (non­
instrumental) desires with pleasure and happiness, states naturally de­
scribed as states o f feeling.
Now consider what attempts atjustification look like at terminal and
10. “The truths known by intuition," he says, “are die original premises from which 
all others are inferred”—and by ‘intuition’ Mill does not mean what a late-nvenlieth- 
century philosopher would: he uses the word as a synonym for ‘consciousness’, i.e.. Tor 
“whatone seesand feels” (VII :C—7).
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nonterminal locations in the respective foundationalist structures we 
have just described. A belief that is not simply the correlate of a sensation 
ought to come with a further justification: other propositions that you 
believe. So when someone asks you why you believe it, you can, if the 
belief is not unjustified, adduce these further propositions. But when 
you are asked why you hold a terminal belief (that is, a belief that is 
simply the correlate of a sensation), there is no further proposition lo 
adducc. All you can do is reiterate your claim to be sensing what you arc 
sensing, or feeling {since Mill takes sensation to be a species o f feeling) 
what you are feeling.11
This is the point of Mill’s remark that “the only proof capable of 
being given that an object is visible, is that people actually see it.” Philos­
ophers have misread the passage by overemphasizing the modal dimen­
sion of ‘visible’ (and, in the following sentence, of ‘audible’) , taking ‘vis­
ible’ to mean “capable o f being seen." This is a mistake. ‘Visible’ here 
means, if you like, “can be seen”; but only in the sense in which a pilot 
might report that he can see the target: he secs the target. ‘Audible’ is 
likewise meant in a similar sense, the sense in which the petrified victim 
in the monster movie whispers, “It’s audible now—I can hear it moving 
down below." This means, not that in some other possible world, the 
monster is heard moving down below, nor that in the future, with some 
extra effort, the monster might be heard, but that in this, actual world, 
the monster is now heard moving down below. At the terminus o f the 
chain of justification, when we have gotten back to the sensations, the 
only “proof" that an object is visible, that is, is seen, is to gesture once 
again at its being seen. The only “proof” that an object is audible, that 
is, is heard, is to gesture at its being heard.
This is Mill’s model for “desire as proof of desirability.”13 At a non­
terminal location in a chain of practical justification, the end occupying 
that location and the justification for it are distinct; whether something 
is desired, and whether it is desirable, are two different questions. Asked 
why you want to do such-and-such, you can adduce the further ends to 
which it is a means. But at the terminus o f the chain, when we have come 
back to the feeling o f pleasure or happiness, or the desire whose satisfac­
tion is that feeling, there is nothing further to be said. All there is to the 
desirability o f the object of the desire is that it is desired, and all there is 
left, at the end o f the chain, for ‘desirable’ to mean is “desired.”
11. It might be thought that, at the terminus of ihe chain of justification, belief, feel­
ing and justification all collapse into one. But Mill does in fact continue to distinguish the 
feeling from the belief, for reasons having to do with the role of general terms in observa­
tion. These Issues can be put aside here.
12. The phrase Is borrowed from Norman Kreumann, "Desire as Proof of Desir­
ability,” in Utilitarianism with Critical Essays, ed. Samuel Goroivitz {Indianapolis: Bobbs- 
Merrill, 1971), pp. 231-41 (originally published in Philosophical Quarterly 8 [1953]: 
246-58).
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We are now in a position to give the first o f Mill’s two reasons for 
withholding the title o f “proof” from his argument for the Principle of 
Utility. Recall again that Mill was also the author o f A System of Logic: “The 
proper subject.. .  o f Logic is Proof” (VII: 157), and so we should not be 
surprised to find that ‘proof’ is, in Mill, a technical term.1* Proof is infer­
ence, the movement from evidence to conclusion: “We say of a fact or 
statement, that it is proved, when we believe its truth by reason of some 
other fact or statement from which it is said to follow” (VII: 158).
In so far as belief professes to be founded on proof, the office of 
logic is to supply a test o f ascertaining whether or not the belief is 
well grounded. With the claims which any proposition has to belief 
on the evidence o f consciousness, that is, without evidence in the 
proper sense of the word, logic has nothing to do. (VII: 9)
Sensations, and the beliefs that correspond to them, are not inferred, 
and so when wc get back to sensations, we have left the domain o f prop­
erly so-called “proof.” Likewise, the "first principles” of conduct are ul­
timate ends, desires that are, for the instrumentalist, ex hypothesi not 
inferred from further premises. The only question that arises regarding 
these desires is whether one actually has them, and that is a matter of 
“consciousness” or "intuition.” Since they are not inferred, they too lie 
outside the domain of proof.
Let’s return from this lengthy excursion to the first stretch o f Mill’s 
argument. Its conclusion was that cach person’s happiness is desirable 
for him. Let us keep in place Mill’s restriction to ends that are not de­
sired merely as means to further ends, but on their own account. Then 
happiness, recall, is, simply as a matter o f terminology, what one desires. 
Again, with the restriction in place— that is, when we arc at the termini 
of the agent’s chains o f means-end justification—‘desirable’ just means 
“desired”: there is nothing else left for it to mean. So the conclusion of 
the argument just means that what one desires (non instrumen tally), one 
(noninstrumentally) desires. Recall further that the premise of the ar­
gument turned out to mean only that cach person desires what he de­
sires. We can now see why the first stretch o f argument is so short: the 
inference rule being used is p —$p. And it is evidently not fallacious after 
all, contrary to the views o f Moore, Sidgwick, and many others: if any 
argument is deductively valid, it is this one.'4
13. As far as the point at hand goes, Mill's use or'proof* as a technical term matches, 
and justifies his invoking, "the ordinary and popular meaning of the term” (207/1:5). But 
th e r e  is a further point, which we will soon come to, that stretches what is today the ordinary 
meaning a good deal.
14, Deductive validity notwithstanding, there are a couple of difficulties that are 
worth highlighting. In working the finger-exerdse version of the first stretch of argument, 
the claim that happiness is the aggregate of the objects of nonimtrumental desire is going 
to play a pivotal role, and the question is how we come by it. There seem to be two ways of
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Before moving on to the second stretch of Mill’s argument, we need to 
pause briefly to consider wliat we are to malce o f the first. The strctch of 
argument we have been looking at consists entirely in the repetition of 
the trivial truth that people want what they want, and seems to be a mat­
ter o f laying out a series of verbal equivalences. This might still seem 
hard to believe, but any residual incredulity' can be met by Mill’s own 
red esc rip tion of his thesis: “what is the principle o f utility,” he asks, “if it 
be not that ‘happiness’ and ‘desirable’ are synonymous terms?" (258n. /  
5:35n.). Still, if that is all there is to the argument, what is it doing here? 
How could Mill, normally so impatient with “reasoning [that] consists in 
the mere substitution o f one set of arbitrary signs for another,” have 
thought it to be worth presenting?1*
We can begin by giving the second reason that Mill withholds the 
title o f ‘proof’ from this stretch of argument. Commentators have gen­
erally assumed that if Mill is unwilling to call his argument a proof, he 
must mean at least that the argument is not deductively valid.16 But to 
take Mill this way is to get him exactly backward. With the stipulated 
meanings o f the words put in place, the first stretch of Mill’s argument 
turns out to be the repetition of a tautology. Now, in A System of Logic, 
Mill *'exclude[s] from the province o f Reasoning or Inference properly 
so called, the cases in which the progression from one truth to another 
is only apparent, the logical consequent being a mere repetition o f the
IV
getting there. The first is to read it off the subsequent argument, by noticing lhat Mill tal.es 
being an object of noninstrumental desire to be equivalent to being a component of hap­
piness. But if this is wliat Mill is doing, then he seems to be entirely ignoring questions of 
the organization of the parts of a person's happiness into a whole. And I think that this is a 
genuine problem in Mill's view.
The second way of getting the pivotal claim is to use the verbal equivalence of ‘hap­
piness’ and 'pleasure’, and then lhat of ‘desiring a tiling’ and 'finding it pleasant’. The 
problem here is that pleasure ha1* to come out being the object of desire; but as we ordinarily 
use the words, to find something pleasant is not the same as that thing's being pleasure. By 
our lights, there is a slide from treating pleasure as a propositionat attitude io treating 
pleasure as the object of the attitude. Now. by the end or the passage that introduces the 
equivalence, it is clear lhat Mill takes himself to have introduced the terms in a way that 
bridges the apparent gap: having said that “to desire anything, except in proportion as ihe 
idea of it is pleasant, is a physical and metaphysical impossibility," he then says, by way of 
repetition, "that desire can [not] possibly be directed to anything ultimately except plea­
sure." But why would Mill want to use his words this way? I will towards the end of Ihe 
argument return to the question of what substantive view underlies this aspect of Mill's 
vocabulary.
15. VII: 176; compareVIII: 760-61.
16. For instance; "Mill stands accused of committing glaring logical blunders.. . .  
such accusations. . .  are not justified,. . .  he explicitly states that a proof, in the commonly 
understood sense of the word, of the Utility Principle . . .  cannot be given. So he is not 
claiming to present a deductively valid argument—which is what one must assume him to 
be doing to pin on him the familiar fallacies” (Skorupski, pp. 285-86).
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logical antecedent."17 Proof is inference, and to count as an inference, 
Mill holds, there must be more to the conclusion than to the premises. 
So neither a tautology nor its repetition can count as a proof. This is 
not, it needs to be emphasized, a minor or dispensable Millian doc­
trine. Mill was embarked on the radical empiricist project of showing 
diat there is mo such thing as deductive inference; it is one o f the more 
important burdens o f the System to argue that all inference (and con­
sequently all proof) is inductive.1*1 Because the position is so alien to 
contemporary1 sensibilities, commentators tend to leave it behind when 
they read Mill’s political and ethical writings; as a result, they badly mis­
interpret the passage we are reconstructing. Mill is denying that his ar* 
gument is a “proof,” not because it is not deductively valid, but precisely 
because it is.
We have two reasons on the table for Mill’s first stretch o f argument 
not being a proof. One is its subject matter; ultimate ends are a category 
of items picked out as beyond the reach o f inference or proof. The other 
is the argument’s form: the argument is (we would say) deductively valid 
and (Mill would have insisted) merely “apparent, not real” (VII: 158)* 
We can now see that the subject matter explains the form. When infer­
ence is no longer available, all Mill can do is remind us o f something we 
already know, “not proving the proposition, but only appealing to an­
other mode o f wording it, which may or may not be more readily com­
prehensible by the hearer.” 1'J Mill is not in a position to argue that hap­
piness is what we are really after, but he can put it to his reader in a way 
that will remind the reader that what is at stake for him is that he get 
what he wants, and that this is what lie calls “happiness." “If the end 
which the utilitarian doctrine proposes to itself were not, in theory and 
in practice, acknowledged to be an end, nothing could ever convince
17. VIE: 162; the full discussion appears in die previous section, at VII: 158-62. See 
n. 48, below.
18. VII: 186-03, This may also seem hard to believe; after all, Mill would not have 
denied, of a syllogism like, ‘All men are mortal; the Duke of Wellington is a man; so the 
Duke of Wellington is mortal,* that when the major premise is true, all its instances are true 
also. However, we now have a widely familiar analog of syllogistic reasoning as Mill under­
stands it, and highlighting the analogy may make Mill's claim seem more reasonable.
Think of the file compression utility (e.g., Zip or Compress) on your computer. When 
you compress and reexpand a (lie, you do not think of yourself as deriving new results, but 
as merely reformatting the file for more convenient storage or access. Now, in Mill’s view, 
the actual inference to the Duke of Wellington’s mortality is from particulars to particulars: 
from ‘A was a man, and he died’, and 'B was a man. and he died too’, and so on, and 'The 
Duke of Wellington is a man', to ‘The Duke of Wellington will die’. The major premise of 
our sample syllogism is not part of the inference proper, but is rather a way of storing the 
observed evidence In a way that makes it easy to keep track of and use; the syllogism is a 
method of extraeling aheady available information, not of Inferring new information.
19. VII: 158-59; compare VH:66, or again, the Analysis: "We can afford. . .  no aid to 
the reader in distinguishing [a pleasurable or painful sensation], otherwise than by using 
such expressions as seem calculated to fix his attention upon it" (James Mill, vol. 2, p. 190).
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any person that it was so" (234/4:3). Now if what Mill is trying to elicit 
is an acknowledgment of what the reader already has as an end, Mill’s 
logical views make syllogistic deduction an appropriate vehicle. Sylli> 
gisms are a means of “deciphering our own notes’* (VII: 187), and the 
point of deductively valid “argument" is to remind us to what we arc al­
ready committed.*0
What is doing the work in Mill’s argument? The first stretch of ar­
gument reduces to a series o f interlocking definitions, and interlocking 
definitions o f themselves only produce empty tautologies. Now, as Mill 
himself remarked, “most questions o f naming have questions o f fact ly­
ing underneath them.’’11 Wc have already seen one instance of this 
phenomenon, in the view that feelings, in Mill’s sense, terminate chains 
of justification; this allowed Mill to choose terminology that identified 
pleasure, happiness, and the objects o f noninstrumental desire. I want to 
suggest that Mill’s interlocking definitions are underwritten by his instru­
mentalist understanding of practical reasoning, and that this instrumen­
talism is the motor of the first stretch o f argument, and of Mill’s utilitari­
anism more broadly.
This is an occasion to say more precisely what I mean by ‘instrumen­
talism’. I am using it as the label for the still widely shared view that there 
is only one kind o f practical inference, that which takes you from an end 
to the means to that end; or, in psychological vocabulary, that practical 
reasoning consists in moving from a desire for one object to a desire for 
a way of bringing about or attaining that object. Grant that justifying an 
end amounts to recapitulating an inference by which that end could he 
arrived at. Every instrumentalist inference proceeds from a desire. So 
instrumentalism guarantees that when a chain o f practical justification is 
followed back to its terminus, there will be a desire at the terminus.
It is tills that licenses “desire as proof of desirability.” Suppose for a 
moment that instrumentalism were false, and that practical inferences 
could proceed from premises that were not desires. Then “desire as 
proof o f desirability” would have to be given up, and replaced with the 
much less suggestive “whatever premises arc used to demonstrate desir­
ability arc, taken jointly, proof o f desirability".” The identification of 
those premises with a class o f feelings that cannot be argued about, but 
simply gestured at, would be suddenly implausible. ‘Happiness’ would
20. So while Mill did not think that deduction Kas properly understood as inference, 
he did not deny, but rather insisted on, die heuristic importance of deduction, and syllogis­
tic deduction in particular. See, e.g., VTI: 19G-99; VII1:663,
21. VII: 15n.; this quotation is from the 1856 edition of Tht System of Lope, and was 
omitted in subsequent editions. Compare his criticism, at VII;93-97, of views of naming 
on vrhich all truth comes out merely verbal, and his discussion “Of Propositions Merely 
Verbal” where he claims that “when any important consequences seem to follow. . .  from 
a proposition involved in the meaning of a name, what they really flow from U the tacit 
assumption of the real existence of the objects so named” (VII: 113).
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no longer be a reasonable label for the aggregate of those premises. 
Mill’s precision-tooled vocabulary would become unusable, and his ar­
gument would cease to make sense. Instrumentalism is the substantive 
premise lying beneath the first stretch of argument, and expressed 
through the terminological stipulations that make it up.
Many philosophers think that there must be a close and intrinsic 
connection between rational motivation and what we can for the mo­
ment call the Good. Instrumentalism makes it hard to see the depen­
dence as running from the Good to the motivation: if you don’t happen 
to have the right desires, the knowledge that such-and-such is the Good 
will not amount to a reason to act. So it is natural to reverse the direction 
of dependence: the Good is analyzed as a construction out of one’s pref­
erences or desires or ultimate ends— that is, as something very' much like 
Mill’s sophisticated notion of utility. So we should expect to find the 
philosophical motivation for utilitarianism and its relatives to be instru­
mentalism, in cases other than Mill's.
V
It’s time to turn our attention to the second stretch o f Mill’s argument: 
the move from “each person’s happiness is a good to that person” to "the 
general happiness, therefore, [is] a good to the aggregate of all persons” 
(234/4:3). The objection, recall, was that the conclusion just doesn’t 
seem to follow from the premise. Rather than repeat my phrasing o f the 
complaint, I’ll let Sidgwick give his version:
even if we grant that what is actually desired may legitimately be
inferred to b e . . .  desirable__an aggregate o f actual desires, each
directed towards a different part of the general happiness, does 
not constitute an actual desire for the general happiness, existing 
in any individual; and Mill would certainly not contend that a de­
sire which docs not exist in any individual could possibly exist in 
an aggregate o f individuals. There being therefore no actual de­
sire—so far as this reasoning goes— for the general happiness, 
the proposition that the general happiness is desirable cannot be 
in this way established: so that there is a gap in the expressed 
argument. .  .K
If the gap is genuine, a further premise will be needed to fill it. (Sidgwick 
volunteered “the intuition o f  Rational Benevolence.”) But it is worth 
noticing that Mill himself had heard similar complaints, and thought 
there was no gap. Here is Mill responding to a criticism of Spencer’s that 
was evidently very close to Sidgwick’s:
[Spencer] says . . .  the principle o f utility presupposes the anterior 
principle, that everyone lias an equal right to happiness. It maybe
22, Henry Sidgwick, Tht Methods of Ethics (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1981), p. 388.
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more correctly described as supposing that equal amounts of ha[>- 
piness arc equally desirable, whether felt by the same or by differ­
ent persons. This, however, is not a /^supposition; not a premise 
needful to support the principle of utility, but the very principle 
i tself. . .  (258n./5:55n.)
Tilts is an obscure passage, and it is still too early to try to say what it 
means; it is clear enough, however, that Mill does not agree that there is 
a missing premise. So wc should try to find an interpretation of the ar­
gument on which all the pieces are in place. I propose to do that in what 
may seem like an especially roundabout way, by returning to the model 
of practical reasoning that, I claimed a moment ago, drives the first 
stretch o f Mill’s argument.
I introduced instrumentalism as the doctrine that all practical rea­
soning consists in finding means to ends, or, equivalently, finding wavs 
to satisfy the desires one has. But that is simply not enough to count as a 
complete theory o f practical reasoning. First o f all, this very minimal in­
strumentalist theory’, or rather, theory fragment, takes no account of a 
very basic fact o f human life, that you can get what you wanted and still 
be disappointed. (This fact has a less depressing flip side, that you can 
be pleasantly surprised by something you had not desired.) In Mill’s vo­
cabulary, the problem can be located in the ambiguity of the phrase 'find 
pleasant’, which, it will be recalled, is introduced as equivalent to ‘de­
sire’: in desiring something you may find— that is, expect—it to be pleas­
ant, but that does not mean that when the otyect of your desire is ob­
tained, it will be found— that is, turn out— to be pleasant. The possibility 
o f having the thought that you were uTong about what you had wanted 
has got to be accommodated in one way or another.
Second, the theory fragment says nothing at all about choice in the 
face o f competing desires. Almost every' decision involves competing pri­
orities, and so a putative theory of practical reasoning that failed to speak 
to the issue at all would not be much o f a theory of practical reasoning: 
it would not explain how you figure out what to do.2* So the minimal 
theory fragment must come supplemented in a way that enables it to 
address these requirements.
Instrumentalism is an exclusionary view: only means-end reasoning 
counts as practical inference. So the supplement must consist not o f fur­
ther rules of inference, but o f a penumbra, around the one legitimate 
rule, o f claims about the material to which it might apply. The Bentham­
ite penumbra consisted in the view that pleasures could be felt to he 
stronger or weaker; that the stronger pleasure was to be preferred; and 
that pleasure itself, as opposed to the more or less reliable means 
through which it might be obtained, would never disappoint. This is 
not the place to reconstruct Mill’s reasons for rejecting Bentham’s views;
23. Mill registers his awareness of this demand at VIII :931.
MUlgram Mill’s Proof 295
Copyright © 2000. All rights reserved.
296 Ethics January 2000
suffice it for now that Mill found implausible the notion that pleasures 
could differ only in strength: “Neither pains nor pleasures arc homoge­
neous, and pain is always heterogeneous with pleasure” (213/2:8). Mill’s 
more sophisticated alternative is presented in chapter 2 o f Utilitarianism, 
in the course o f a discussion whose ostensible purpose is to meet the 
objection that utilitarianism is a moral theory unable to accommodate 
our interests in the finer things in life. The relevant passages are these:
Of two pleasures, if there be one to which all or almost all who have 
experience o f both give a decided preference . . .  that is the more 
desirable pleasure. (211/2:5)**
From this verdict o f the only competent judges, I apprehend diere 
can be no appeal. On a question which is die best worth having of 
two pleasures, or which of two modes o f existence is die most grate­
ful to the feelings . .  . the judgment o f those who are qualified by 
knowledge o f both, or, if they differ, that of the majority among 
them, must be admitted as final. And there needs be the less hesi­
tation to accept this judgment respecting the quality o f pleasures, 
since there is no other tribunal to be referred to even on the ques­
tion o f quantity. What means are there o f determining which is the 
acutest of two pains, or the intensest of two pleasurable sensations, 
except the general suffrage o f those who arc familiar with both?
What is there to decide whether a particular pleasure is worth pur­
chasing at the cost o f a particular pain, except the feelings and 
judgment o f the experienced? (213/2:8)
The test of quality, and the rule for measuring it against quantity, 
[is] the preference felt by those who, in their opportunities o f ex­
perience, to which must be added their habits o f self-consciousness 
and self-observation, are best furnished with the means o f compari­
son. (214/2:10)
Mill’s proposal, often referred to as the "decided preference crite­
rion,” addresses the second lacuna in the instrumentalist theory frag­
ment directly: competing desires are to be referred to the preferences, 
over their objccts, o f the majority' of the experienced. And the first la­
cuna is indirecdy addressed; if we think of what will be a disappointing 
object o f desire as in competition with the con trasting state o f not having 
it, the preference over these options can be corrected by appealing to 
the preferences o f the already-disappointed.
Mill is providing a logically decisive criterion of desirability. It is “fi­
nal,” a “verdict. . .  [from which] there can be no appeal”; “there is no
24. The omilted phrase is a qualification designed to avoid circularity in the establish­
ment of a specifically moral criterion. This omission is repeated in the next passage.
The passage is introduced as an explanation of difference in quality in pleasures, as 
opposed to quantity. But since, as we will see in a moment, quantitative comparisons work 
no differently, we can disregard the apparent restriction in scope.
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other tribunal." The experientially privileged (as I will call them hence­
forth) are not being used as reliable witnesses of some independent mat­
ter o f fact; no matter how reliable, it is always possible that all the ivit- 
nesses are wrong; but Mill’s experientially privileged judges are infallible. 
(The metaphor is instructive: a judicial verdict constitutes the legal fact) 
Like a contemporary decision theorist, Mill is not taking the utilities to 
be reflected (possibly inaccurately) in the preferences; rather, he is tak­
ing them to be constructions from the preferences.25
Contemporary instrumentalists need to supplement the instrumen­
talist theory fragment, for the same reasons that Mil) must, and it’s worth 
pausing for a moment to point out the similarities and the differences in 
their respective solutions to the problem. Brandt, in this regard an en­
tirely typical moral philosopher o f the last generation, “call[s] a person’s 
desire, aversion, or pleasure ‘rational’ if it would survive or be produced 
by” a process he labels “cognitive psychotherapy.” Rawls defines “a per­
son’s plan of life [as] rational if” it satisfies two conditions, one of which 
is that it “would be chosen by him with full deliberative rationality, that 
is, with full awareness o f the relevant facts and after a careful considera­
tion of the consequences.”20 As these examples suggest, the fashionab'e 
way of doing these things nowadays is to invoke a counterfactual self: 
what is decisive is what a better-informed, more carefully deliberative, 
and otherwise improved version of yourself would think or rant. Mill 
manages to avoid the many problems that come with relying on counter- 
factual selves57 by appealing to the actual preferences o f a majority of
25. Mill does differ from contemporary decision theorists in how lie thinks of pref­
erences. The current economist's notion or preference ties it very closely to overt behavior: 
preference is “revealed" in choice. Mill’s notion of preference is closer to that of a com­
parative evaluation: one such preference is described as "a full appreciation of the intrinsic 
superiority of the higher [pleasure].*’ The description appears in the course of Mills ac­
knowledgment lhat "the influence of temptation" and "infirmity or character" may ptio- 
duce the opposite “election” (212/2:7)—“election" being much nearer to what we would 
call “preference” today.
26. Richard Brandt, A Theory of the Good and the Right (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1979), p. 113; John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 
1971), pp. 408-9; cf. also pp. 417,-421-22; empliases mine.
27. Mill’s take on what these problems are is sufficiently nonstandard to be worth 
spelling out. First, appeal to the preferences of counterfactual selves involves making psy­
chological predictions (about what you would prefer if . . . ) ,  But psychological laws fall into 
two categories. On the one hand, there are what Milt calls “Empirical Laws," that is, uni­
formities that are observed to hold, but whose underlying reasons are not understood. M ill 
holds that these cannot be relied upon "beyond the limits of actual experience"; varying 
the “collocations" (Mill’s term for boundary conditions) may disrupt the uniformity (VII: 
516,519,548; for ‘collocation*, Vll; 465). But assessing the truth of a psychological count;r- 
factual normally involves “varying” the collocations “from those which have actually be;n 
observed” (VTI:516), So Empirical Laws cannot be relied upon to assess psychologist 
counterfactuals. On the other hand, there are psychological predictions derived from the 
fundamental laws of the human mind. These are Ironclad, but, unfortunately, they cannot 
normally be applied. What a person will do in response to a given stimulus is a matter of his
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(other) people.*8 But the devices have a good deal in common. Each uses 
suitably chosen persons as what engineers call a black box. We can vary 
the box’s inputs, and see what outputs it produces. We are instructed to 
use the outputs in a certain manner. But we are given no account what­
soever o f what goes on inside the box. I will return to this point shortly; 
but it is now time, finally, to reconstruct the second stretch o f Mill’s proof 
of the Principle o f Utility.
VI
Mill’s object is to show that the general happiness is desirable to every­
body (or, “to the aggregate of all persons”— a turn of phrase I’ll gloss a 
few steps down the road). Consider a particular person, say John Doe. 
The problem was that the desires he currently has do not necessarily 
involve a desire for the general happiness; and that even if Doe does have 
such a desire, it might be insufficiently weighty in his scheme of things. 
Blit we now have Mill’s technique for correcting desires, and for showing 
that something that someone does not in fact desire may be desirable for 
him nonetheless. If an overriding preference for the general happiness 
can be shown to be the preference of the majority o f the experienually 
privileged, then it will have turned out to be desirable for John Doe, even 
if John Doe himself does not actually desire it.w And since John Doe is
character; his character is shaped by his entire history; and this is not something we can 
observe (VI1:8G5). Consequently, a criterion that appealed to psychological counterfactuals 
would be unusable; there is simply no way to determine what you would prefer, i f . . .
Mill’s second problem is that there are many coumerfactual selves—some dulled, 
some especially nasty, some overly tremulous, etc.—whose judgments are going to have to 
be ruled ottt as defective. It’s hard to believe that this can be done without importing into 
the selection or coumerfactual selves the full and robust set of evaluations that the use of 
the coumerfactual selves was meant to certify. But if this is what is going on, this use of 
counter factual selves is viciously circular: “to explain away the numerous instances of diver­
gence from their assumed [moral] standard, by representing them as cases in which the 
perceptions are unhealthy" is “ [a] striking instance of reasoning in a circle” (Vlll:826).
Notice that this Is also a reason for not looking to the preferences or a carefully cho­
sen coterie of right-tit inking persons: appealing to the judgments of the phronimoi will not 
do. This is why Mill usually requires only experience of the options being compared. And I 
am accordingly inclined to think that his sole mention of “habits of self-consciousness and 
self-observation” is a slip on Mill’s part.
28. A quick textual point, for those who are used to reading the passages in question 
as invoking counterfactttals. In English, counterfactuals are generally (although not neces­
sarily) signaled by the subjunctive mood. These passages, amounting to about half a page 
of text, contain not even a single subjunctive, and the explanation cannot be stylistic: Mill’s 
discussion of "Permanent Possibilities of Sensation” uses the subjunctive without hesitation 
(e.g., IX: 184).
29. If this sounds implausible—why should I care about what other people prefer, if 
their preferences turn out not to match mine?—notice that the currently popular counter- 
factual technique has the same problem. Why should I care about wliat a counterfactual 
self would prefer, if his preferences turn out not to match mine?
The difficulty is, however, perhaps especially acute for Mill, who in On Liberty had
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simply an arbitrary person, to show that the general happiness is desir­
able for John Doe is to have shown it to be desirable for everybody.
A first glance at the experientially privileged might make this seem 
an unpromising strategy. For present purposes, the relevant group can 
be taken to be, very roughly, people who have both experienced an im­
provement in the general happiness at some cost to themselves, and, on 
some other occasion, experienced an improvement in their own happi­
ness at the expense of the general happiness. When we look around at 
such people, it is hard to say offhand that one preference predominates; 
and certainly the cynical among us will suspect that those with the egois­
tic preference are bound to outvote the altruists.
But when votes don’t go the way you like, there’s a standard solution: 
gerrymander the voting districts. Mill, the radical utilitarian activist, 
would have thought of the response in more noble-sounding terms; the 
obstacle to enacting the utilitarian political program, he was convinced, 
was the restriction of the franchise, and the first item on the agenda was 
always to distribute the right to vote more broadly. What populations 
should we survey, when we are looking for the experientially privileged? 
All those now living, certainly; but there is no obvious principled reason 
for excluding the judgments of persons past and future, and if there is 
no reason to exclude them, they must be taken account of as well; the 
group to be surveyed is, in Mill’s phrase, “the aggregate of all persons” 
(234/4:3).30 This bit o f redlstricting has the potential drastically to alter 
the outcome of any poll: the human race has had a short and under­
populated past, and Mill would have expected it to have a long and 
populous future. So the votes o f the future experiendally privileged will 
outweigh the votes of their predecessors; what the future sees to be desir­
able, will (by the decided preference criterion) be desirable. So we need 
to determine what the experientially privileged of the future will prefer.
Mill himself raises the problem we have been trying to solve for him: 
“why am I bound to promote the general happiness? If my own happi­
pointed out that others’ experience may be an “unsuitable” guide if one has an “un­
customary" character, that “human beings are not . . . undistinguishably alike," “that 
people have diversities of taste, . . . Jand] different conditions for their spiritual develop­
ment," and that there “are . . , differences among human beings in their sources of plea­
sure, their susceptibilities of pain, and the operation on them of different physical and 
moral agencies” (XVIII: 262,270).
I will get around to discussing the more general version of this problem in due course.
30. Kretzmann notices and highlights this move, but worries that be has “extended 
[Miilj and even departed from him" (Kretzmann, p. 241).
One other worry that might arise at this point is whether the decided preference 
criterion is really usable: do we have to wait until at! the votes are in before we can makeup 
our minds? Notice, however, that this problem is very like another that utilitarianism al­
ready has. When assessing an action or rule, how far into the future do we need to look for 
the effects it will have on overall utility? The in-principle answer is, of course, to the end of 
time; but that cannot be the normal procedure.
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ness lies in something else, why may I not give that the preference?” 
(227/3:1). The occasion for asking the question is his discussion of “The 
Ultimate Sanction of the Principle o f Utility,” in chapter 3 o f Utilitarian­
ism. Chapter 3 is conventionally taken to have nothing to do with the 
subsequent "proof” in chapter 4: the former, it is said, deals with ques­
tions o f motivation, while the latter has to do with questions o f justifica­
tion, and the consequentialist form of Mill’s theory makes these entirely 
separate questions. As we arc already in a position to see, however, the 
criterion of desirability introduced in chapter 2 entails that these are not 
separate questions, after all. And as we should by now expect, chapter 3 
contains the last missing premise: Mill’s view, and the argument for it, as 
to what the experientially privileged o f the future will prefer with regard 
to the general happiness.
The chapter contains a number of intertwined arguments, and in 
the interest o f brevity I will here pick out just one strand. Because each 
individual has an interest in oi/iurs’altruism, individuals, whether or not 
altruistic themselves, will, “in proportion to the amount o f general intel­
ligence” (228/3:3), support measures that will induce utilitarian atti­
tudes in their fellows:
whatever amount o f this feeling [for the good of others] a person 
has, he is urged by the strongest motives . . .  o f  interest. . .  to the 
utmost o f his power to encourage it in others; and even if he has 
none o f it himself, he is as greatly interested as any one else that 
others should have it. Consequently, the smallest germs of the feel­
ing are laid hold o f and nourished by . , .  the influences o f educa­
tion; and a complete web of corroborative association is woven 
round it, by the powerful agency of external sanctions.
. . .  the influences arc constantly on the increase, which tend 
to generate in each individual a feeling o f unity with all the rest; 
which feeling, if perfect, would make him never think of, or desire, 
any beneficial condition for himself, in the benefits of which they 
arc not included. If wc now suppose this feeling o f unity to be 
taught as a religion, and the whole force o f education, o f institu­
tions, and of opinion, directed, as it once was in the case o f reli­
gion, to make every person grow up from infancy surrounded on 
all sides both by the profession and by the practice o f it, I think that 
no one, who can realize this conception, will feel any misgiving 
about the sufficiency o f the ultimate sanction for the Happiness 
morality. <2S2/3:9)S1
31. Mill has just given a prediction of the future state of society. Now we saw that Mill 
does riot think that individual p s y c h o lo g ie s  are predictable {n. 27, above). But he thinks 
that problems of individual psychological prediction can be sidestepped when large groups 
or people are being studied. The political scientist "can get on well enough with approxi­
mate generalizations on human nature, since what is true approximately of all individuals 
is true absolutely of all masses" (VII: 603). Mill had been Impressed by the new science of 
statistics (VIII: 932) anti was quite willing to believe that even if you could not predict the
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Sooner or later, Mill thinks, self-interested motives make it almost in­
evitable that institutions guaranteeing a society o f natural utilitarians be 
put in place. The persons crcated by these institutions will prefer the gen­
eral happiness to any other alternative.312 Bccause these institutions will be 
stable, the persons shaped by them will outnumber those living in previ­
ous historical periods. The preferences o f the majority of the experien­
tially privileged are decisive with respect to desirability o f the objects of 
one’s desires.83 And consequently, the general happiness is desirable for 
each individual, no matter what his desires, and so is desirable for every­
one. The second stretch of Mill’s argument is deductively valid as well.
VII
Before considering how well the two stretches o f Mill’s argument sit to­
gether, I want to make a couple o f remarks about the stretch o f argument 
that we have just seen.
counter-factual preferences of individuals, under certain circumstances predicting the pref­
erences of the majority of ihe experiential!)’ privileged was well within the realm of possibil­
ity (VIII :846-47; cf. VIII ;873,890).
In that case, the reader might be wondering, why not appeal to thecounterfactttal pref­
erences of the experientially privileged as a group? AVhy the reliance on actual preferences? 
M ill does not actual ly discuss th is option, bu t he would have had reasonsfor not availinghitn- 
self of it. First of all, the desi red social science (the science of character, which Mill d ubbed 
“Ethology”) was never more than a gleam in his eye; barring special circumstances, such as 
the argument we now have on hand, we don't for the present have any way of predicting the 
preferences of a group. Second, prediction in the social sciences has Its limits, and of precise 
predictions of the history of society, extended arbitrarily far into the future (similar to those 
we have come to expect from astronomy). Mill thought, “ there i s . . .  no hope” (VHI:877). 
Small errors snowball, and so the predictions of a "Deductive" science like Ethology would 
need to be continually checked against and corrected by observation—in this case, observa­
tion of the actual preferences of the experientially privileged. Since the actual preferences 
are not, on Mill’s account of the social sciences, dispensable, he may have preferred to cut 
out, as so much wasted motion, the detour through counterfactuals.
32. Mill sometimes suggests that the economic arrangements of the future will alio 
work to mute the conflict between the alternatives; e.g., in the Principles of Political Economy, 
he speaVj of a time when “civilization and improvement have so Tar advanced, that what is 
a benefit to the whole shall be a benefit to each individual composing it,” having in mind 
in this case die more equitable distribution of gains in productivity (111:768),
33. There’s a nicety here that deserves pointing out. The criterion of desirability in­
troduced in chap. 2 avoids circularity by specifying that the preferences consulted shall be 
those given “irrespective of any feeling of moral obligation to prefer” one item rather than 
another (211/2:5), (See n. 24, above.) In order to prevent this condition from excluding 
the preferences of the acculturated utilitarian majority for the general happiness over all 
else. Mill argues that the "strengthening of social ties. . ,  leads [each individual] to identify 
his feelings more and more with [others*] good. . .  He comes, as though instinctively, to be 
conscious of himself as a being who of course pays regard to others. The good of others 
becomes to him a thing naturally and necessarily to be attended to" (231-32/3:9,emplia- 
ses Mill’s). Future utilitarians, thinks Mill, will not W'ant one thing but feel constrained by 
the moral law to prefer another. Their desire for the general happiness will be a native 
preference, one that can thus serve as grist for the “decided preference” criterion.
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First, the argument is valid, that is, its conclusions follow from its 
premises. But it is not, I think, sound. It was reasonable in Mill’s day to 
believe that entire populations could be made over into the natural ad­
herents of any ideology whatsoever. In addition to the considerations we 
have just laid out, Mill had a number of other reasons for thinking that 
utilitarian indoctrination would be possible. Some are mentioned in the 
same chapter, for example, the receptiveness o f normal individuals to a 
humane ideology appealing to the sympathetic feelings. Others, such as 
his associationist psychology, are left in the background. But Mill’s rea­
sons are now beside the point: today we know better. The twentieth cen­
tury has been a large-scale test o f the effectiveness o f ideological indoc­
trination, and it has turned out not to work. Mill thought that Comte 
had “superabundandy shown the possibility of giving to the service of 
humanity . . . the psychical power and the social efficacy of a religion” 
(232/3:9). But Mill and Comte were, as a matter o f empirical fact, mis­
taken.’4
Contemporary moral philosophers mil tend to find the use o f an 
empirical premise of this kind unsettling: if we have gotten the argument 
right, evaluative issues, such as whether the general happiness is a good, 
or the most important good, are contingent. This is easily overlooked 
when we are considering the long-term social processes that Mill thought 
would result in a society o f utilitarians. But the desirability o f the general 
happiness depends not just on the sociological laws that make those pro­
cesses seem inevitable; there must be a sufficiently long run in which they 
are able to do their work. If human history is prematurely truncated by 
natural catastrophe, then utilitarianism will be made false: an asteroid 
striking the earth can, on this view, destroy not only things of value, but 
the values themselves.^ Assessing the plausibility o f this view is a topic 
for some other occasion; for now, it suffices that this upshot is not a rea* 
son to think we have misread Mill. Mill’s official view is that no body of 
theory'— logic and the mathematical sciences included— is a priori true 
or necessary;96 so moral facts should be no less contingent than any other
34. For a lengthier and much more thorough rendition of Mill’s views on this point, 
see his essay, “Auguste Comte and Positivism*’ (X: 263-368).
35. There is in fact a more likely way for the contingency of value to exhibit itself, 
and one which I suspect worried Mill a good deal. If j i ’s being preferable to B is a matter of 
the majority of the experientially privileged preferring A to B, then A’i  being preferable to 
J3 depends on there being individuals having experience of the different options: if there 
are no such individuals. or perhaps not enough of them, then there is no fact of the matter 
as to which is preferable. The applicability or the decided preference criterion requires that 
there be people who tr)’ things out—who conduct, in Mill's phrase, "experiments of living’’ 
(XVIIL2CI)—and I am inclined to think that this was one of Mill’s reasons for insisting so 
strongly on the liberty to try things out. (Notice the awkward tradeoff: in order for there to 
be a standard of preferability, people have to, and hence have to be encouraged to [XV11I: 
269], do what will prove to be the incorrect tiling.)
36. SeeVII:227,231,237-61,277.
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facts. Whether Mill managed to live up to his official view is a question 
that I will address when the time comes.
Second, the conclusion of Mill’s argument was that the general hap­
piness is "a good to the aggregate o f all persons” (234/4:3). And we saw 
Sidgwick, not a typically, trying to read Mill as meaning that the general 
happiness is desirable for the aggregate: that it is a good of, as it were, 
the collective entity made up of all persons. But this, we can now see, is 
to misconstrue the sentence, and in particular, to mistake the force of 
the preposition. Mill is not committed to anything along the lines o f a 
collective good. The “aggregate o f all persons” is not some metaphysi­
cally dubious creature whose good the general happiness is, but the 
population from which the experientially privileged who provide the test 
of desirability' are drawn. “The general happiness [is] . . .  a good to the 
aggregate of all persons” means, roughly; among all persons, those ca­
pable o f judging from experience, or at any rate a majority o f them, find 
(or will find) the general happiness to be a good.37
Before proceeding to its problems, let me pause to recapitulate the 
merits of the argument as I have reconstructed it. It is deductively valid. 
That it is deductively valid explains Mill's unwillingness to call it a proof, 
and does so without uncharitably construing Mill as attempting to excuse 
his own sloppincss in advance. The premises of the argument arc con­
tributed by the previous chapters o f Utilitarianism; on the reading just 
advanced, the book is a single argument, each carefully machined com­
ponent of which is necessary for the conclusion finally draim in chaj>- 
ter 4. And that conclusion proves to be metaphysically sane, in not pro  
supposing the existence o f collective social organisms with desires and 
interests.
If the reading I have given is on target, the text proves to be much 
more tightly written, and in some ways much more difficult to swallow, 
than it is usually taken to be. Mill is often pressed into service as the 
spokesman of a vague and well-meaning lowest common denominator 
of liberalism. But Utilitarianism is not a quotable collection of inoffensive 
platitudes. It is philosophical writing of the most muscular kind.
37. The sentence can read on the model of sentences like: “To the scientific com­
munity, the theory of relativity is true." Norman Kretzmann takes Mill's argument to le£Ji 
in a pragmatist direction (Kretzmann, p. 239), and it is In this vicinity that 1 find his sugges­
tion most evocative.
At this point we are able to say what Mill has in mind in his response to Spencer. That 
“the truths of arithmetic are applicable to the valuation of happiness” (258n./5;35n.) is to 
be read off the preferences of the experientially privileged. (TTiey are not always applicable: 
higher and lower pleasures are incommensurable, and this fact is also to be read off the 
preferences of the experientially privileged.) The processes that will make future persons 
Into natural utilitarians will, Mill further argues, also create persons who take it for granted 
“that the interests of all are to be regarded equally" (231/3:9).
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VIII
We have seen that Mill’s argument is valid, but it is not for that reason 
unproblematic. It5 problems are worth exploring, and it is now time to 
take a closer look at them.
The first stretch o f Mill’s argument was driven by the common core 
of instrumentalist accounts o f practical reason: the view, which I earlier 
pointed out is somewhat less than a theory of practical reasoning, that all 
practical inference is means-end inference. Since any chain of practical 
inferences will terminate in a desire that one just has, and since, at the 
end o f the chain, there is no further argument to be given for the desir­
ability of the final end, desirability can be identified with being desired. 
This identification underwrites Mill’s treatment o f felt desire “proving” 
desirability on the model o f felt sensation “proving” the basic premises 
of one’s system of beliefs.
The second stretch o f Mill’s argument exploits a device introduced 
to handle the shortcomings of the theory fragment that is the common 
core. These shortcomings, recall, were that the desires one actually has 
cannot be made the measure o f desirability after all, due to the possibility 
of disappointment, and that the need to choose between competing de­
sires must be accommodated in one’s theory' o f  practical reasoning. The 
device Mill uses, a standard made up of the preferences of other more 
experienced persons, adheres to the letter o f the instrumentalist com­
mon core, in that it does not require any further forms of practical infer­
ence, over and above means-end reasoning. The inputs to one’s practical 
inferences are indeed being corrected, but not inferendally. The cor­
rected preferences are generated by a black box, a device whose inner 
workings are invisible and irrelevant.
The problem, at the level of the underlying account of practical rea­
soning, is this. An instrumentalist theorist who has gotten to this point is 
not in a position to justify the use (or choice of) a black box; he cannot 
say why what it produces are corrected preferences. For suppose there 
were an argument that showed the method employing the black box to 
be a method of correction. That argument could with minimal effort be 
turned into an argument that the desires or preferences produced by 
the method were correct. But that argument would be an instance o f prac­
tical reasoning; that practical reasoning would be noninstrumental; and 
so acknowledging it would mean abandoning the instrumentalist com­
mon core.*® The incoherence is, as far as I can see, inescapable: the prob­
38. It might look like (here are a couple or places to get off the boat here: you might 
object that the reasoning in question isn’t actually practical, or, alternatively, tliat, although 
practical, it is merely means^ntl reasoning. But while one can always get out of the boat, it 
turns out that, in this case, there’s no pier handy to step onto.
Notice, first, (hat the two objections are not as di(Tcren( in spirit as they might at Arse 
glanccscem to be. Since the reasoning was identified as practical by identifying its conclu­
sion as practical, the first objection requires Insisting that that con elusion does not give the
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lem is a problem not only for Mill, but for contemporary instrumentalists 
who appeal to counterfactually informed desires. Any instrumentalist 
must use some such device; but justifying the device means abandoning 
instrumentalism. Instrumentalism is consequently an insupportable view 
of practical reasoning.59
The incoherence near the surface of Mill's argument can be sum­
marized as follows. The first stretch of the argument makes sense on the 
supposition that, once you have gotten through the instrumental justifi­
cations, there is nothing to be said for an object o f desire being desirable, 
other than that you desire it. The second stretch of argument makes 
sense on the supposition that there is something more to be said about 
whether an object o f desire is desirable, namely, that certain other 
people, better situated than you are, desire it (or that they don’t). Mill is 
careful to avoid actual contradiction; the decided preference criterion 
can be inserted parenthetically at the appropriate points in the first
agent a reason for action. Now this latter thought is normally underwritten by the idea that 
sentences like “I ought to do this" or "This is the correct preference” do not express rea­
sons for action because they do not express desires. But the requirement that reasons fcr 
action be desires is in turn normally underwritten by instrumentalism.
Because Ihe point of correcting the agent’s preferences ivas to pick out his reasoris 
for action, let’s abandon the first objection in favor of the second: the reasoning Is con­
ceded to be practical, but is entirely means-end, that is. correcting one’s preferences is 
shown to be a way of satisfying some further desire. But now the reasoning so construed 
faces an uncomfortable dilemma. Either tlie desires from which It proceeds are corrected, 
or they are not. If they are uncoiTected, then we have Ihe appearance of a pragmatic con­
tradiction: the conclusion of the reasoning, recall, was that one should use in one’s practical 
reasoning, not one’s uncorrected, but corrected desires or preferences. If, on the other hand, 
they are corrected, then we have the question blatantly begged. To see (hat. consider the 
"black box” lhat corrects your preferences to mine. Asked why you should regard my pref­
erences as those you should act on, rather than your own, 1 would not convince you liy 
answering: because I would prefer it. The cleanest way out of the dilemma would be to 
invoke desires or preferences that one was sure would not need correction, and so for 
which the uncomfortable choice does not arise. But the confidence required here would 
be inappropriate for human beings; to be sure (ahead of time, of any desires) that one will 
not be disappointed—so sure, as to be willing to make those desires a pivot ofone’s pracii- 
cal logic—is just to show a failure of imagination in the course of setting oneself up for a 
fall. Human beings can end being disappointed in any tiling.
39. The point is not that appeals to informed desires are in principle dispensable: 
taking the argument in that direction would bring us around to a  conclusion 1 would not 
wish to endorse, that there are no properties that can be understood only via the reactions 
of their perceivers. (Such properties have traditionally been called "secondary qualities.") 
The point is, rather, that the explanation for taking the perception of some secondary 
quality to provide a reason for action will involve a non instrumental pattern of practical 
inference.
The problem of informed desires is an interesting and important topic in its own 
right, not merely an unworkable fix for instrumentalism. I do not here mean to be endoi-s- 
ing one or another approach to it, and in particular I should not be taken as recommending 
the decided preference criterion as a replacement Tor contemporary counterfactual-bastid 
devices.
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stretch of argument without aborting it/*0 But the two stretches o f argu­
ment cannot both make sense together.
This near-surface incoherence is, we now see, the immediate expres­
sion o f a similarly shaped incoherence in the underlying view of practical 
reasoning. Instrumentalism is the engine o f Mill’s utilitarianism, and in­
strumentalism is not a sustainable view of practical rationality. Mill’s inge­
nious proof of the Principle of Utility does not commit the crude mistakes 
for which it is known. It commits instead a deep and philosophically inter­
esting mistake, and one from which we have much to learn.
IX
I have argued that Mill’s instrumentalism gets him into trouble; so we 
now need to explain Mill’s being an instrumentalist- I’ll begin by explain­
ing why an explanation is called for.
Instrumentalism, once again, is the view that all practical inference 
is means-end inference. So it is a view about what patterns o f inference 
are legitimate, which is to say that it is a logical thesis, in Mill’s sense of 
“Logic.” Now Mill was not in the business o f accepting received views 
about inference just because they were received: hisS>J*m of Logic, I have 
already mentioned, argued for the heretical view that deducdve infer­
ence is not actually inference at all. Mill was not shy when it came to 
argiiing for philosophical views that he needed. So if instrumentalism is 
a view in Logic, if it is explicitly acknowledged, and if it is doing the work 
for him that I have argued it is, then Mill, o f all people, should be provid­
ing us with an argument for it.
But the expected argument is conspicuously lacking. The closest 
Mill comes is a discussion which perhaps can be made to speak to a 
puzzle we have had on the queue for a while. Recall that I suggested that, 
on Mill’s view, the claim Uiat people desire their own happiness amounts 
to a tautology, roughly, that people desire what they desire; Mill, how­
40. Very quickly: To desire something, non instru men tally, is to find the idea of it 
pleasurable, that is, to expect it to be pleasurable; and since the “decided preference crite­
rion” is being used as a way of correcting desires so their objects aw found pleasurable, we 
can read ‘desired* as 'desired, subject to correction by the judgments of the experientially 
privileged'. Happiness means pleasure, and so now means something like: the aggregate of 
the objects of one’s desires, as corrected by the preferences of the experientially privileged. 
So the premise of the stretch of argument that we are now marvering comes out as: the 
objects or desires corrected by the preferences of the experientially privileged are desired, 
when those desires are corrected by the preferences of the experientially privileged. Once 
again, the premise of the argument is a tautology. Now one’s noninstrumental desires, cor­
rected by tiie preferences of the experientially privileged, are what is desirable (by the “de­
cided preference criterion"). So the conclusion, that each person’s happiness is desirable 
for him, comes out meaning: the objects of one’s desires, as corrected by the preferences 
of the experientially privileged (that Is, when attained, happiness), are the objects or one’s 
desires, as corrected by the preferences of the experientially privileged (that is, what is 
desirable). The conclusion is also, once again, a tautology; and is, once again, the premise 
of the argument repeated.
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ever, describes the claim, not as true by terminological stipulation, but 
as “psychologically true” (237/4:9). Now this might o f course simply be 
a reflexive expression o f Mill’s doctrine that the truth of any claim is an 
empirical question, but there is likely to be more to it than that: tautolo­
gies need not be “unmeaning” if they bring to the fore the presupposi­
tions that make the vocabulary in them usable.41
For Mill's psychological views, the best source is his father’s Analysis 
of the Phenomena of the Human Mind, to which the younger Mill, as editor 
o f a second edition, added extensive commentary. That commentary 
consists quite often o f rather blunt correction; we may take it that where 
the editor’s notes do not indicate disagreement or qualification the views 
expressed are John Stuart Mill’s as well. So we should look to the Analysis 
for the question of psychological fact that Mill takes to He beneath die 
questions of naming.41 Now what remains, in ‘people desire what they 
desire*, to be underwritten by experimental psycholog)', is the nonredun- 
dant assertion that people desire: that human beings are wanting crea­
tures. And the Analysis does indeed contain an extended exposition of 
just this view. Desires are analyzed (as ideas of pleasure); commonplace 
desires (e.g., for “Wealth, Power, and Dignity”) are accounted for; and 
their role in producing action is explained.4-'1
That human beings are desiring creatures, and that their desires 
move them to action, is not itself an argument for instrumentalism. Mill 
was quite clear diat whether something is an inference is a matter not of 
what one does, but o f what one should do. The Analysis does contain an 
association ist reconstruction of the psychological movements involved in 
means-end reasoning; and it defines the Will in such a way that “in all 
cases in which the action is said to be W iled, it is desired, as a means to
41. IX:468-69; the passage provides two examples.
42. S een .21 above.
43. Mill, Analysis, vol. 2, pp. 191-92, for the analysis; notice the younger Mill’s modi­
fication to the definition in the editorial footnote at pp. 194-95. For the desires for wealth, 
etc., see pp. 207-14. For the role of desires in action, see pp. 256-59,262n.-64,327-403.
We can now tie up another loose end: the analysis of desire accounts for what we 
would see as the terminological slide that I highlighted in n. 14, above. Like his son,James 
Mill identifies, as a matter of terminology, pleasure (or more carefully, the representation 
of pleasure) with desire: "The terms. . .  ‘idea of pleasure,’ and 'desire,’ are but two names; 
the thing named, the state of consciousness, is one and the same" (pp. 391-92; cf. p. 327). 
A desire just Is an idea of the sensation of pleasure, which idea may be associated with other 
ideas, most prominently, of causes of the sensation. It follows that understanding desires as 
(what we would nowadays call) propositional attitudes, i.e., attitudes whose objects are as it 
were logically integral to the mental state, is a mistakr, “when the word desire is applied to 
the cause of a sensation . . .  it is employed in a figurative, or metaphorical, not In a direct 
sense" (p, 351). What we would call the objects of desire are actually just the causes of 
the real objects, pain and pleasure: “The illusion is merely that of a veiy close association" 
(p. 192), This view, quite startling by today’s lights, accounts for Mill's treating the moves 
from desiring X, to finding X pleasurable, to desiring pleasure (which happens to be asso­
ciated with X) as traversing a series of innocuous synonymies.
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an end.”'14 But there is no argument to the effect that associations that 
proceed in these ways (and only in these ways) are correct, and the Analy­
sis similarly reconstructs other patterns o f association that clearly are not 
understood inferential!)', for example, “proneness to sympathize with 
the Rich and Great.”*5 Mill’s psychological views go a great distance to­
ward explaining why he chose the terminology he did, and why he re­
garded it as expressing interesting empirical facts; but it does not help at 
all in providing Mill with grounds for his instrumentalist take on practi­
cal reasoning.
Beyond these considerations, Mill’s corpus contains no treatment of 
the problem whatsoever.™ One possible explanation is that the thought 
that practical inference might have a placc in an exhaustive treatment 
of the theory o f inference eluded him, because "Logic, as [Mill] con- 
ceive[d] it, is the entire theory o f the ascertainment o f reasoned or in­
ferred truth” (VII: 206)— and practical inference is naturally seen as 
having something other than truth as its formal object. Since what we arc 
trying to explain is Mill’s silence on the matter, any line we take will be 
going out on a limb. But as long as we are being speculative, there is a 
way of playing out this possibility that I would like to explore.
Let us consider for a moment what a Millian investigation of the 
forms of practical inference would have looked like. Mill had definite 
views about how to argue about logic; it is an empirical science, and one 
establishes what the correct forms of inference are inductively.4* To show 
that a candidate pattern of inference is legitimate, that is, is a pattern of 
inference, is to show, among other things,48 that it works; and the demon­
stration must be an induction from particular instances.
Now verification o f this kind ultimately comes down to observation 
of particular cases,** Assessing the effectiveness of a particular inference 
will involve assessing the starting points and terminus of that inference. 
You must determine that, for instance, the premises o f an argument be­
ing inspected were true, and the conclusion was also true; and doing this 
will require observing matters o f particular fact. So the empirical inves­
tigation o f inference requires the ability to make observations in the per­
44. Ibid., vol. 2, pp. S57n., 378.
45. Ibid., vol. 2, pp. 209-11,
46. To be sure, one can see how the fact that human beings are desiring creatures 
might be made the starting point of an argument for the view we are considering. But the 
argument is notin  Mill, and the mode of argument, as we will see in a moment, would not 
be one that Mill could admit.
47. See VII: 567-77; also VII: 306-14: VIII: 833.
48. Foremost among further criteria that need to be satisfied in order for a mental 
transition to amount to an inference is, recall, that “the conclusion is . . .  wider than U>e 
premises from which it is drawn” (VII :288). Mill never seems to have asked whether means- 
end reasoning, which he endorses, satisfies this condition, and it is unclear to me, in view 
of his discussion of parallel questions, how he could have given a satisfactory answer,
49. See,e.g.,VII:193.
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tinent domain. Were the putative inferences to be practical, that would 
mean making observations whose content was practical; that is to say, 
some statements along the lines o f “Such-and-such is desirable" would 
have to count as observations.
Milt was a British Empiricist— the fourth o f the great British empiri­
cists, and the most thoroughly radical. Even Hume had allowed logic to 
be a priori; Mill was determined to be empiricist about logic as well. But 
even Mill was not an empiricist to the end. Like his predecessors, he took 
the class of basic observations for granted: they were sensations, the dei- 
cendents of (most recently) Humean “impressions of sensation.”50 Be­
cause he was not empiricist enough to allow what an observation is to be 
an empirical question, there was no room in his systematic view for prac­
tical observation. Without practical observation, there was no room for 
the empirical investigation of practical inference. And so, despite his 
avowed empiricism about logic, Mill allowed himself to treat his views 
about practical inference as true a priori.
Mill has recendy gotten a certain amount of publicity for having 
taken an empiricist approach in moral matters.51 But, if I am right, the
50. Even though sense-daca are now out of style, taking a class of basic observations 
for granted is not. A familiar recent example is ran Fraassen’s identification of observation 
with “what the unaided eye discerns” (The Scientific Image [Oxford: Clarendon Pres;;,
1980]), p. 59; see also pp. 16 ff,, 56 ff.. 214; for criticism, see essays in Images of Science: Essajs 
on Realism and Empiricism, ed. Paul Churchland and Clifford Hooker {Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press, 1985]).
51. Anderson, for instance, adduces under this heading Milt's diagnosis of his ner­
vous breakdown as an "experiment in living" (Elizabeth Anderson, "John Stuart Mill anil 
Experiments in Living," Ethics 102 [1991]: 4-26). I think that it can be so understood, but 
not the way Anderson would like to: Mill himself was surprisingly unsuccessful in learning 
the lessons of his breakdown and partial recovery. He was never able to provide a satisfac ­
tory account of the importance in his own life of Romantic poetry; willing to surrender 
neither his instrumentalism nor his associationism, he was forced to treat the resistance of 
associations formed under the influence of poetry to analytical corrosion as a brute psycho­
logical fact. And while Mill is quite clear about his own motivational structure up until his 
breakdown, his view of himself after his recovery fails, quite strikingly, to matcli the ways hi; 
thought, felt, and lived. I hope to discuss these issues further elsewhere.
There is another confusion in Anderson’s paper that is common enough to be worth 
remark, Anderson thinks that “Mill’s emphasis on the intrinsic desirability of gratifying the 
{higher] sentiments strongly suggests that he believed that dignity, beauty, honor, and so 
forth are values distinct from pleasure,” and she takes Mill to be departing from “the basic 
premise of ethical hedonism, that pleasure w the sole respect in which things can be intrin­
sically valuable.” She concludes that "Mill’s conception of the good is not hedonistic but 
pluralistic and hierarchical.”
But this is just to lose track of Mill's terminology. For something to be desirable is, ai 
we have seen, just to be desired (noninstrumentally, and subject to the correction of tin; 
experientially privileged); tills is, merely as a matter of nomenclature, lo be found pleasur­
able. Consequently, being pleasurable, in Mill’s sense, is not a respect in which tilings can 
be found desirable. And If we tie the word ‘hedonism’ to Mill’s word 'pleasure*, whether 
Mill’s conception of the good is “pluralistic and hierarchical” has nothing at all to do with 
•whether it is “hedonistic.”
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publicity is unwarranted: it was precisely here that Mill chickened out. 
Mill is able to let what people want be a matter of experience,52 and find­
ing out how to get what one wants is o f course a matter o f experience. 
But that what matters is people getting what they want is not a matter of 
experience, because Mill is barred from understanding the preferences 
of the experientially privileged as observations. This restriction is on dis­
play in two particularly prominent places. The first is the infallibility of 
the collective preferences of the experientially privileged. Mill cannot be 
providing an empirical test for distinguishing higher from lower plea­
sures, because empirical methods are fallible. Second, the processes de­
scribed in chapter 3 o f Utilitarianism, through which the preferences of 
the majority o f the experientially privileged are to be brought into line, 
are too clearly manipulative to allow the resulting preferences to be un­
derstood as observations. The citizens o f Mill’s Brave New World are be­
ing conditioned. The resulting preferences depend on the social pressures 
that drive the processes o f conditioning, and not, in anyway appropriate 
to observation, on the preferences’ objects.
And so we have come to the final moral 1 wish to drawr from the story 
I have now finished recounting. We have already seen that Mill’s utilitari­
anism is very closely tied to his instrumentalism; that his argument for 
the Principle of Utility, while tight, is deeply incoherent; that the inco­
herence stems from an incoherence in instrumentalism; and that Mill’s 
instrumentalism turns out to have been an island o f apriorism in an oth­
erwise empiricist project. It is tempting to think that if Mill had been 
willing to look to experience at this point also, his theory of practical 
reasoning, and consequently his moral theory, would have turned out 
quite differendy—and perhaps less incoherently. So the final moral is 
that if you’re going to be empiricist, be empiricist all the way: about 
practical reasoning, and about observation.
52. That people want happiness is, we have seen, a verbal matter, and not a matter of 
experience at all. But for that reason, happiness is not a  substantive account of what is 
wanted; the substantive account is to be given by empirical investigation of what people, 
and their experientially privileged stand-ins, actually desire.
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